<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>Malware-Analysis on Emanuel's Blog</title><link>https://blog.e-valente.io/tags/malware-analysis/</link><description>Recent content in Malware-Analysis on Emanuel's Blog</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 19 Aug 2026 12:00:00 -0300</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://blog.e-valente.io/tags/malware-analysis/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Aray: Validating YARA Rules Without Handling Malware</title><link>https://blog.e-valente.io/posts/2026-08-19-aray-yara-validation/</link><pubDate>Wed, 19 Aug 2026 12:00:00 -0300</pubDate><guid>https://blog.e-valente.io/posts/2026-08-19-aray-yara-validation/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;A YARA rule is easy to share. The malware sample used to prove that the rule works often is not.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That gap matters in detection engineering. Teams need positive fixtures to test scanners, alerting, incident-response automation, disaster-recovery workflows, and CI pipelines. Using live malware for those tests creates a separate operational problem: isolated infrastructure, handling controls, retention policy, and specialist oversight. A useful test artifact must satisfy the rule without reproducing the behavior of the malware that originally triggered it.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>